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Aila Niinimaa-Keppo Totta asiaa - vaietuista aiheista

Venäjä terrorisoinut Georgiaa jo vuosikymmeniä

Uuden Suomen keskusteluissa löytyy näkemystä, että Georgia olisi aloittanut elokuun 2008 sodan. Tämä ei ole totta, sillä venäläiset aloittivat joukkojen siirron Roki-tunnelia pitkin Etelä-Ossetiaan jo toukokuussa 08. Tämä tieto on faktaa eivätkä presidentti Medvedevin suomalaisille esittämät väitteet asiaa muuksi muuta. On suorastaan järkyttävää, miten Medvedev voi vakavissaan kauhistella Naton sotaharjoituksia Georgiassa, vaikka itse on ampunut kovilla omissa "harjoituksissaan" Georgian maaperällä ja syyllistynyt mm. massiiviseen etniseen puhdistukseen mm. Abhaziassa.

Alla Georgian parlamentin selvitys elokuun hyökkäystä edeltäneistä ajoista. Uudempiakin löytyy, mutta tämä on selkeä ja hyvin dokumentoitavissa. Parlamentissa on sekä presidentti Saakashvilin kannattajia että vastustajia, mutta kaikki tietävät ja tunnustavat Venäjän rikokset Georgiaa kohtaan. Selvitykseen kannattaa tutustua jokaisen, jolla on mielipide elokuuun sodasta.

http://www.parliament.ge/index.php?lang_id=GEO&sec_id=63&info_id=13323

FACTS OF RUSSIAN POLICY TOWARDS GEORGIA
Source: Parliament of the Republic of Georgia

Conflicts (past):

• Russia was directly involved in the initiation of conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in early 90s, first through an intensive delivery of arms to conflicting sides, and later through direct participation of its military personnel serving in Gudauta military base in military actions against Georgia; this conflict resulted in massive ethnic cleansing of Georgian population. More than 300 thousand residents, mostly ethnic Georgians, but also Greeks, Estonians, Ukrainians and other ethnic minorities, had to flee.

• Semi official units of Russian volunteers played a key role in military operations in Abkhazia. Battalions of Cossacks and northern Caucasians were created, armed and trained by Russian military intelligence service (GRU). These units were safely transported to the conflict zones in Georgia. Vivid example is the creation of “Confederation of Mountainous People” on the territory of Russia, led by Soslanaliev and Shanibov (Russian GRU residents), which played an important role in mobilizing, training and arming volunteers in Russia. One of such volunteers was Shamil Basaev, later the UN-recognized terrorist, then commander of “Chechen Battalion” in Abkhazia, Deputy Defense Minister of Abkhazia and “Hero of Abkhazia”;

• After conclusion of cease-fire agreement on July 27, 1993 between Abkhaz’s and Georgians under the Russian guarantees, Georgian side withdrew all heavy equipment, tanks, ACVs and artillery units from Sokhumi. Russian side did nothing to make Abkhaz’s keep the same commitment. As a result, joint Abkhaz-Chechen-Russian units took over disarmed Sokhumi and organized massive ethnic cleansing of a peaceful Georgian population;

• Russian military aircrafts and helicopters have violated Georgian airspace on numerous occasions. Georgian territory was several times bombed by Russian military aviation ,leading to casualties among the local peaceful population;

Conflicts (present):

• Starting from 2004, acting high level Russian officials from the Russian Ministry of Defense, Federal Security Service, Military Intelligence and Border Guards occupy official posts in de-facto authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia;

• In January 2006 Russia officially refused to support the Peace Plan for the conflict in South Ossetia, prepared by the Government of Georgia and supported by the OSCE Ministerial in Ljubljana in December 2005. As a result, implementation of the Peace Plan is still blocked and there is no progress in resolving conflict in South Ossetia;

• After the deployment of Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia, more than 2000 Georgians have been killed and 8000 houses have been burn in the Gali district, which is in the security zone and within the area of direct responsibility of Russian peacekeepers;

• Despite the numerous requests of Georgian side Russia refuses to establish an international control over the Roki tunnel in South Ossetia, which is the main channel of arms delivery to South Ossetia;

• 17 military maneuvers have been carried out in South Ossetia within the area of responsibility of Russian peacekeeping forces. Large military parade involving tanks, ACVs, artillery, and other prohibited equipment was held on September 20, 2005 in Tskhinvali. All demonstrated military equipment was transferred to Ossetian side by the Russian Ministry of Defense in recent years;

• Several attempts have been made by Ossetian criminal gangs to shut down helicopters flying over central parts of Georgia following the only flying route from Eastern to Western Georgia. One of such attempts has been made against the presidential helicopter. All these attacks have been implemented using Russian mobile anti-aircraft systems, delivered to South Ossetia from Russia through Roki tunnel and granted to Ossetian military units by Russian special services;

• Helicopter of the Minister of Defense was shut down, but the crew and passengers safely escaped. The same day, de-facto president Kokoiti declared that anybody who shuts down Georgian helicopter will be awarded 50,000 USD, and a person who kills Georgian Minister of Defense will be awarded 500,000 USD. Neither Russian peacekeepers, nor Russian MFA made any statement condemning such an open call for terror;

• Russia has been tolerating or promoting aggressive and unjustified interference with internal political developments in those regions of Georgia, as seen during the de-facto presidential elections in Abkhazia;

• No efforts have been made to protect the human rights of individuals living in the conflict zones where the Russian military forces are present and have effective or limited control of the situation (bearing in mind the decision of the European Human Rights Court in the case of Illascu and others vs. Russian Federation and Moldova). Ethnic Georgian population is deprived the basic human rights like the right to return home, the right to move freely, and the right to receive an education on a native language;

• Against all international standards and obligations, Russia unilaterally imposed visa regime with Georgia without any prior consultations. Even more – despite numerous protests of the Georgian side and relevant international organizations, Russia unilaterally established visa-free regime for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, giving therefore a signal of direct political support to separatist regimes;

• Russian authorities initiated, accelerated and completed process of granting Russian citizenship and issuing Russian passports to inhabitants of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This process was officially carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia without any prior consultations and despite the numerous protests of Georgian side and international organizations;

• In violation of the basic principles of international law and decisions of the CIS summits, Russian officials frequently travel to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, publicly demonstrate political support to separatist regimes, make investments and rise funds for different projects;

• President of Russia had several meetings with de-facto authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia without any prior notification of Georgian side or international community. In official press-statements of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs de-facto authorities are officially called “presidents”;

Terrorist attacks, Threats of use of force, interference into internal political life:

• Russian military intelligence (GRU) residents in Georgia planned and organized terrorist attack in Gori in 2005. This attack took lives of three police officers;

• Gas transit pipeline was blown up on the territory of Russia in winter 2005. Simultaneously, high voltage electricity line was also damaged. As a result, Georgia was left without gas and electricity in a middle of severe winter. There are still no results known about the investigation of this case, Russian side shows no evidence of having interest in investigating this terrorist attack;

• Russian military intelligence (GRU) residents in Georgia planned and organized multiple terrorist attacks against pipelines, high-voltage electricity lines and railways in Kartli region in 2004 and 2005;

• Russian officials regularly make public statements threatening Georgia with military aggression. This concerns not only politicians and members of the State Duma, but also Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs;

• In a statement made on Russian television President Putin’s foreign policy advisor, Mr. Gleb Pavlovski said, referring to Georgian-Russian relationship and President Saakashvili’s policy, that “sometimes difficult problems can be solved with one bullet”.

• Military maneuvers are regularly held in Northern Caucasus, near the Georgian borders without prior notification of Georgian side. According to public statements of Russian Minister of Defense and other military commanders participating in these maneuvers, the main objective is to train forces to enter the territory of Georgia, protect Russian citizens in Georgia and reinforce Russian peacekeeping forces in conflict areas;

• Russia provided safe asylum to leaders of Georgian and international organized crime, so called “thieves-in-law” Tariel Oniani and Zakhar Kalashov. Both of them received Russian citizenship despite the fact that they are officially wanted by Ministry of Interior of Georgia ,Spanish Police and INTERPOL. At current these persons, as well as other criminals operating in Moscow, are engaged in planning unrests in Georgian penitentiary system;

• Local Georgian warlord Emzar Kvitsiani, who organized armed mutiny in Kodori Gorge (Upper Abkhazia) in 2006, escaped to Russia. Despite multiple requests of the Georgian side there are no signs of his possible extradition by Russia;

• In 2006 assassination attempt was made against one of the leaders of Georgian oppositional Conservative Party Mr. Koba Davitashvili. Suspect, Mr. Giorgi Kurtaev, who is a Russian citizen, escaped to Russia. Despite official requests of the Georgian side, Russia haven’t seen any signs of cooperation in extraditing suspected criminal;

• In 1995-99 series of terrorist assassinations against political leaders, high level officials of law-enforcement agencies and businessmen took place in Georgia (including two attacks on President Shevardnadze). As it became evident from the investigation later, all these attacks had been planned and organized by Igor Giorgadze, Russian KGB officer, then Minister of Security of Georgia. Giorgadze escaped from Georgia and is officially wanted by Georgian Ministry of Interior and the INTERPOL from 1999. Up to this moment he lives in Moscow, moves freely, holds press-conferences, and publicly (through media) thanks Russian prosecutor-general office for support;

• Starting from 2005 Giorgadze possesses huge sums of money, which he uses for creating and funding different satellite groups in Georgia. Objective of these groups is to organize massive unrests in Tbilisi, provoke violence, detain key state officials, and change Government in Georgia. Part of members of these groups were recently arrested by Georgian police and they testified in open court hearing that fund flows for coup d’Etat were coming from Moscow, from Russian special services through Giorgadze ;

Economic pressure:

• Russian side, without prior notifications or explanations, has several times imposed total ban on issuing Russian visas to citizens of Georgia traveling to Russia. Such a ban is in force at the current moment;

• Russia prohibited import of agricultural goods, wine, and mineral waters from Georgia. Official argument was violation of sanitary standards. However, the ban was imposed on all production, despite type, producing company, year and place of production. Together with this, Russian side refused to enter into any negotiations on this issue and ignored quality certificates issued by French and Swiss food safety laboratories which Georgian side submitted to Russian Sanitary Service (Georgian wine and mineral water is sold in the EU and USA without any problems). The only reasonable explanation behind this ban is that this is a politically motivated embargo, with an objective to complicate economic situation in Georgia and damage the credibility of Government;

• Russian side has several times blocked the only legitimate border and customs checkpoint in Larsi without any explanation. This checkpoint is still shut down for uncertain time, making therefore impossible any legitimate movement of citizens from Georgia to Russia;

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James Hirvisaari

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